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THE LIMITATION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
CHESTER J. ANTIEAUt
IN THE United States the societal and individual interest in religious
liberty has been deliberately enshrined in the First Amendment to
the Federal Constitution,' as well as in state constitutions. Freedom of
religion, like its companion freedoms, occupies a "preferred position"
in our hierarchy of socio-legal values,2 but it is not an absolute.3  Mr.
Justice Black has said: "No well-ordered society can leave to the in-
dividuals an absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the
State, as to everything they will or will not do. The First Amendment
does not go so far. Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals
from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which are
... imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and
pressingly imminent dangers .... ",4 Clearly the existence of one man's
freedom must be tempered if freedom is to exist in others. The totality
of religious liberty is reduced by indulging a religious zealot to play a
recording outside a church making impossible the worship of many others
within.
In politically organized societies such as the United States, character-
ized by vigilant judicial review, the task of delimiting the "fundamental
freedoms" 5 is essentially the function of the judiciary." We are here
I Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law.
1. U. S. CoNsT. A ,mED. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." These prohibitions are applicable to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
2. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.
S. 78, 86 (1944); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 577 (1944); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 608 (1942).
3. "... the rights with which we are dealing are not absolutes." Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U. S. 105, 110 (1943). "The basic validity of the State's claim to protect the
individual and general welfare against crime, trespass, libel, injury of all sorts to health and
morals, as defined by the community, forbids the easy assumption that there is an un-
qualified right of religious liberty against the Community and the State." BATEs, R=Guxous
LiaRTY 301 (1946). Nevertheless, it is worth recalling Blackstone: "The first and primary
ends of the State are to maintain the personal and civil rights of men." 1 Br. CoMxL 724.
4. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 643 (1943) (concurring opinion
of Justices Black and Douglas).
5. "This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as funda-
mental personal rights and liberties. This phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly
used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights
lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of
this court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties."
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See also Craig v. Harney, 331
221
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
concerned, then, with the judicial function in a particular area; tech-
niques, tests, and decisions.
On occasion the limits of religious liberty have been determined by the
techniques of historical jurisprudence. When an accused claimed that
freedom of religion exempted him from a statute forbidding polygamy,
the United States Supreme Court interpreted our constitutional safe-
guards solely by eighteenth century norms. Chief Justice Waite, speak-
ing for the Court, said: "The word 'religion' is not defined in the Con-
stitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning,
and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the
times in the midst of which the provision was adopted."' Mr. Justice
Cardozo would have utilized an historical approach to freedom of re-
ligion in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,8 where in
his concurring opinion he wrote: "Instruction in military science, un-
accompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an inter-
ference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties
of the Constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history
during days of peace and war."9 Even the Blackstonian notion that free-
dom meant exemption from prior restraint and was no bar to subsequent
punishment'0 has been indulged in by American jurists" who failed to
U. S. 367, 373 (1947); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 570 (1942); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95
(1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.
S. 353, 364 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936); Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis). Note also
the language of the U. N. CHARTER, Art. 1, 11 3.
6. "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and
the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty." CuARLES Ev~xs HuGHEs, ADDRESSES ANv
PAPERS 139 (1908). "The Supreme Court is the Constitution." Felix Frankfurter, quoted
in Cushman, Some Constitutional Problems in Civil Liberty, 23 B. U. L. REv. 335, 336
(1943). "But we act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force
of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court'when liberty is infringed." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624, 640 (1943).
7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 162 (1878).
8. 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
9. Id. at 265. Note also the language of Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dis-
trict v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 594 (1940).
10. 4 BL. Coira. *150.
11. Even Justice Holmes subscribed to that principle in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.
S. 454 (1907). "But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the
press were protected from abridgment on the part not only of the United States but also
of the States, still we should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would
have us reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
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appreciate that Blackstone was not interpreting constitutionally en-
shrined freedoms, but commenting on an immature common law. It is
unthinkable to measure freedom of religion in contemporary America
by the conditions of pre-Revolutionary England. Neither the religious
test oath nor the star chamber furnish guidance or inspiration to the
American judiciary of the twentieth century. The United States Supreme
Court has cogently remarked that "No purpose in ratifying the Bill of
Rights was dearer than that of securing for the people of the United
States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly and peti-
tion than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed."" -
Colonial bigotries and intolerancesP3 are no more desirable charts to
the contemporary area of constitutionally protected religious liberty.
The constitutional debates and utterances of the Founding Fathers have
been cited with equal facility for opposed interpretations of the First
Amendment, 4 and they afford little judicial guidance. Logically, there
is no more justification for interpreting freedom of religion by 1791
norms than in limiting "commerce" to the media of transportation known
in 1787.'5
governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare. Conmonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313, 314; Respub-
lica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas, 319, 325. The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as
to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.
This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in all. Common-
wealth v. Blanding, wbi sup.; 4 Br. CoMr. 150." Id. at 462. Justice Holmes, of course,
repudiated this view in later years. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672 (1925)
(dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes), Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624-631
(1919) (dissenting opinion of justice Holmes).
12. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 265 (1941).
13. "Religious tolerance was not common in the American colonies." FpAENEEL, Our
CnaL LiBERTIEs 51 (1944); See also lyrans, HIsToRr or BworaY n; =ra Uzxm ST,%Tms
(1943); WmrPis, OuR ANCIn T LiBERTIES (1927); P.%rnasoN, FRrX SPEcrrE A D A FnaE
PREss 104 (1939); and CooLyr, Co.srru'no..AL Lm rAious 418 (1868).
14. "The inconclusiveness of the historical argument is apparent from the cases. In
five of the recent major cases involving interpretation of the First Amendment, the writers
of the majority and minority cases [sic opinions?] have both used the historical argu-
ment to prove their point. In each of those cases the argument seemed almost equally
adaptable to the disagreeing judges who arrived at contradictory conclusions. It is sub-
mitted that any argument which is so pliable is of strictly limited utility in deciding
cases." Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 Irs. L. Raw. 53, 57
(1946).
15. "But that the First Amendment limited its protection of speech to the natural
range of the human voice as it existed in 1790 would be, for me, like saying that the com-
merce power remains limited to navigation by sail and travel by the use of horses and oxen
in accordance with the principal modes of carrying on commerce in 1789. The Constitution
was not drawn with such limited vision of time, space and mechanies!' Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U. S. 77, 105 (1949) (dissenting opinion of justice Rutledge). And see Cmua , F=.
SPEEC3 n THE UNTEMD STATES 29 (1941).
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More frequently than historical techniques has the influence of
Jhering's judicial utilitarianism 6 and Pound's pragmatism1 directed the
American judiciary in delimiting religious liberty. Characteristically,
courts weigh societal utilities and interests when, on occasion, the social
and individual interest in freedom of religion clashes with some other
social interest and the need of reconciliation or delimitation arises. In
the heritage of Justices Holmes' and Cardozo, 0 Justice Stone saw that
the judicial function here was a balancing and reconciliation of interests.
In a religious liberty controversy he wrote: " . . . where there are com-
peting demands of the interests of government and of liberty under the
Constitution, and where the performance of governmental functions is
brought into conflict with specific constitutional restrictions, there must,
when that is possible, be reasonable accommodation between them so as
to preserve the essentials of both and ... it is the function of the courts
to determine whether such accommodation is reasonably possible." 20
Justice Rutledge has given a clear picture of the present Court's con-
cept of the judicial function in freedom controversies. He writes: "Where
the line shall be placed in a particular application rests . . . on the con-
crete clash of particular interests and the community's relative evalua-
tion both of them and how the one will be affected by the specific restric-
tion, the other by its absence. That judgment in the first instance is for
the legislative body. But in our system, where the line can constitution-
ally be placed presents a question this Court cannot escape answering
independently, whatever the legislative judgment, in the light of our
constitutional tradition."'" There are sufficient expressions by other
Justices of the Supreme Court22 to affirm that this tribunal is regularly
16. Primarily DFR KAmpr" umas RECHT (1872) and DER Zw Ecx iN RECIT (1877). The
former is available in an English translation by Lalov with an introduction by Kocourek
(Callaghan, 1915), while the latter is available in English under the title, LAW AS MEMS
To AN END, number five in the Modern Legal Philosophy Series. The translation Is by
Husik (Macmillan, 1921).
17. Especially Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. Rav. 445, 453 (1915) ; Pound,
A Theory of Sodal Interests, 15 PROC. Aa. Soc. Soc'y 16 (1921); and Pound, A Survey of
Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1943).
18. "I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty
of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the
often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the
very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious .... o
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
19. CARnozo, THEz NATURE OP THE JUDiC AL PROCESS 102, 112 (1922); CARozo, TnE
PARAVoxas or LFAL SciENCE 72 (1928).
20. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 603 (1940) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Stone).
21. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945).
22. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
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weighing societal utilities in the delimitation of the First Amendment
freedoms.
Supposedly, as Justice Black intimated, the United States Supreme
Court recognizes the clear and present danger test as the proper criterion
to be used in the delimitation of religious liberty. In Canfwell v. Con-
necticut,'s the first Supreme Court decision squarely holding that freedom
of religion is protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court stated: "...in the absence of a statute narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and
present danger to a substantial interest of the state, the petitioner's com-
munication, [playing a victrola record critical of another faith] con-
sidered in the light of the constitutional guaranties, raised no such clear
and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable
to conviction of the common law offense [inciting breach of the peace]
in question." 4 Three years later the same test was applied to enjoin
the enforcement of a public school flag salute requirement of one whose
religious beliefs were opposed thereto .2  The Court, in what is Justice
Jackson's greatest opinion in this area, found not even an "allegation
that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and
present danger ... 2",26 He added that "It is now a commonplace that
censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our
Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present
danger .... ,27 The clear and present danger criterion was also applied
in a companion case upholding the right to teach the impropriety of a flag
salute.2s The following year, however, although it was forcefully argued
330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946); Mlarsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 282 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88, 105 (1940); Hague, Mlayor v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U.S. 496 (1939). However, Justice Jackson felt compelled recently to "disagree entirely
with the idea that 'Courts must balance the various community interests in passing on the
constitutionality of local regulations'" of freedom. Sala v. New York, 334 U.S. 5581 571
(1948) (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson).
23. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
24. Id. at 311. 1 BmL or RIGHTuS REV. 134 (1941), 15 CAxw. B. J. 161 (1940); 40 Cot.
L. REv. 1067 (1940); 3 GA. B. J. 68 (1940); 26 IowA L. R-v. 126 (1940); 15 ST. Jom's
L. REv. 93 (1940); 14 So. CAnr. L. REV. 56 (1940); and 89 U. or PA. L. RLV. 515 (1941).
25. West Va. Ed. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Note, Constitutional
Implications of Compulsory Flag Salute Statutes, 12 Gao. WAsH. L. R-v. 70 (1943); 32
GEo. L. T. 93 (1943); 6 GA. B. J. 249 (1944); 42 AcH. L. REv. 186, 319 (1943); 28
Mm-se. L. REv. 133 (1944); 17 Tnx. L. Q. 465 (1943); 92 U. or PA. L. REV. 103 (1943).
26. West Va. Ed. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
27. Id. at 633.
28. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
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to the Court that "when state action impinges upon a claimed religious
freedom, it must fall unless shown to be necessary for or conducive to
the child's protection against some clear and present danger,120 the high
court nevertheless blithely disregarded the test with no effort to satisfy
itself that a child selling religious literature on the streets was a clear
and present danger to government or to anyone. The United States
Supreme Court has overlooked the test in a number of other highly im-
portant freedom of religion controversies, 0 and inevitably this has cast
doubt upon the tribunal's recognition of clear and present danger as
"the proper criterion."
Various other tests have been suggested and utilized in the delimitation
29. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944), 32 GEo. L. J. 309 (1944), 17
So. CA!rr. L. REV. 310 (1944).
30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946) (reversed a conviction under a statute
making it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after warning not to do
so on the grounds that punishing a person for distributing religious literature on the streets
of a company-owned town was a violation of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
religion); In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945) (held not unconstitutional to refuse an
applicant admission to the practice of law on the ground that he could not in good faith
take the required oath to support the state constitution because conscientious scruples
would prevent his serving in the state militia in time of war); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944) (it was error for the Circuit Court to order a new trial because the
trial court refused to submit to the jury the question of whether the defendants actually
believed the religious views they professed to believe where the defendants were charged
with using the mail to defraud) ; Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943) (religious
sect, claiming abridgment of freedom of speech, press and religion, denied an injunction
against a municipality to restrain the city and the mayor from enforcing an ordinance pro-
hibiting the soliciting of orders for merchandise without securing a license on the grounds
that it could receive adequate protection by prompt trial in the state court and appeal to
the Supreme Court, and since "No person is immune from prosecution in good faith for
his alleged criminal acts." Id. at 163) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943)
(an ordinance prohibiting a person from knocking on a door or ringing a doorbell in order
to distribute a handbill is a denial of freedom of speech and press to a person distributing
advertisements for a religious meeting) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943)
(ordinance requiring one who sells religious literature on the street to pay a license
tax is a denial of freedom of speech and freedom of religion) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) (conviction under a state law prohibiting the addressing
of offensive words to another in a public place is not a denial of freedom of speech since
the statute was strictly limited to prevent acts of violence and breach of the peace) ; Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (state law prohibiting parades without paying a
license tax held constitutional in view of its construction by the state supreme court as
applied to a religious sect marching in close single file in a business district carrying signs) ;
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (an ordinance prohibiting door to door
canvassing without a license requiring a police investigation amounting to censorship is void
as applied to one delivering religious literature and soliciting donations for the religious
sect); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938) (as applied to religious magazines
and pamphlets a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of any kind without a permit
violates the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press).
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of freedom of religion but they are not today influential. Courts occa-
sionally have thought that religious liberty does not excuse "criminal"
activity. An Indiana court has stated: "The religious doctrine or belief
of a person cannot be recognized or accepted as a justification or excuse
for his committing an act which is a criminal offense under the law of the
land."'" This notion goes back to BlackstoneO2 and is ridiculous. For
an American court to imagine that constitutional freedoms are to be
measured by legislative expressions is an utter misconception of a con-
stitutional society and the judicial function.
Frequently courts have asserted that religious liberty protects belief
but not activity.tm An abundance of United States Supreme Court de-
cisions afford proof that activity is within the protection of the First
Amendment,34 and it is unthinkable that the framers of the Amendment
intended to safeguard only cloistered contemplatives.
Probably the most disreputable test is indulged in by judges who
place beyond the pale activities of religious sects or ministers because it
is not really religious in any proper sense. In 1890 Justice Field said of
a religious faith honestly and devoutedly believing in multiple marriages:
"To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense
of mankind."35 Fifty-one years later Chief Justice Hughes pontifically
dismissed a claim of religion with the sentence: "No interference with
religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is
shown.... ."I When a minister refused to fight because of his religious
belief in non-violence, a lower federal court disposed of his claim of re-
ligious liberty in these words: "No question of religious liberty, in any
true sense, is here involved.. . . "" Whether or not the results of the
31. State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 99, 71 N.E. 197, 199 (1904).
32. 4 BL. CoMM. *150.
33. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ; Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878); Bailey v. United States, 134 F. 2d 937, 93S (4th Cir. 1943);
Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 655, 95 Pac. 26, 38 (1908); Mosier v. Barren County
Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, S At.
828 (1886) ; People v. Dale, 47 N.Y. S. 2d 702, 707 (City Ct. 1944) ; 31c lasters v. State,
21 Oka. Crim. 318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922); State v. Kramer, 49 S.D. 56, 206, N.W. 468
(1925); Harlen v. State, 216 S.W. 2d 708 (Tenn. 1948); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va.
839, 44 S. E. 2d 409 (1947); State v. Neitze, 69 Wash. 567, 569, 125 Pac. 939, 940 (1912).
34. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v. ississppi, 319 U.S.
583 (1943) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider %.. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of GriT, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
35. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
36. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941).
37. Rase v. United States, 129 F. 2d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 1942). Note also the language
of Chief Justice Stone in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944); and the New
Hampshire court in State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 57, 192 AtL 629, 631 (1937).
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particular cases are justified, the possibilities of this verbal avoidance are
both considerable and ominous. 8
"Commercial" or "profitable" activities have been denied the con-
stitutional protection accorded religious liberty. "Religion cannot be
used as a shield to cover a business undertaking," one court has said."
Another court has similarly stated: "A person should not be allowed to
practice the tenets of . . . any church as a shield to cover a business
undertaking."4 ° Under this test fortune-telling4" and faith healing42 have
been particularly subjected to regulation notwithstanding claims of re-
ligious liberty. That there are limitations upon the labeling proclivities of
the courts under the Constitution is quite evident from the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Stone in the first Opelika4 case which has now
become the position of the United States Supreme Court.4" And this is
necessarily so for experience with the related freedoms clearly demon-
strates the readiness of some judges to deny the expressions of political
and economic views under the pretext that they are "commercial".
45
Courts have suppressed freedom of religion when they felt it had a
"tendency" to breach of the peace or other public evil.40 Other judges
have denied constitutional protection to religious activity because they
38. Note, for instance, the Government's amazing argument in the Brief for Appellees,
pp. 47-49, Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F. 2d 850 (D. C.
Cir. 1932), that radio speech is not really "speech" within the meaning of the First
Amendment.
39. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 277, 117 Pac. 612, 615 (1911).
40. People v. Cole, 210 N.Y. 98, 111, 113 N.E. 790, 794 (1916).
41. Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 728, 291 N.W. 62, 65 (1940).
42. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911); People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98,
113 N.E. 790 (1916).
43. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942).
44. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
45. See, for example, Conflicting Decisions on Commercial Character of Union Leaflets,
6 INT'L JualD. Ass'N. BULL. 102 (1938); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 299 Mass. 353, 13
N. E. 2d 18 (1938); Almassi v. Newark, 8 N.J. Misc. 420, 150 AtI. 217 (1930).
46. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W. 2d 972 (1942) ; Delk v. Common-
wealth, 166 Ky. 391, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915) ; State v. White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (1886).
And note the amazing language of the United States Supreme Court in the unfortunate de-
cision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 573 (1942). The evils of the tendency
test were apparent to the founders of the republic. Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789 In his
preamble to a draft of A BraL FoR Esr.ausmNo REImIOUS FREEDOM in Virginia: "To
suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his power into the field of opinion or to restrain the
profession or progagation of principles on supposition of their ill-tendency, is a dangerous
fallacy, which at once destroys all liberty, because he, being of course judge of that
tendency, will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the senti-
ments of others only as they shall square with or differ from his own." See also CHAFEE,
THE INQUIRWNG MIND 104 (1928).
[Vol. 18
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considered it an "abuse" of freedom; 41 or because they labeled it "license?'
rather than liberty.48 And some have announced that "harmful" and
"evil" activity is beyond the pale.49 A momentary reflection should con-
vince that these "tests" are without guidance to one who would be law-
abiding, or to the judiciary charged with the responsibility of delimiting
religious freedom. Customarily they have afforded only rationalization
to a judge who was unsympathetic to the particular religious deed. All of
them tempt the courts away from their responsibility to a constitutional
society that has deliberately enshrined freedom of religion, and, though
they survive, without exception they should be condemned.
Probably the most amazing "test" is one uttered by Justice Jackson.
In writing of the United States Supreme Court he has said: "Our basic
difference seems to be as to the method of establishing limitations which
of necessity bound religious freedom.' He then continued, "Mly own
view may be shortly put: 'I think the limits begin to operate whenever
activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the
public.' "I' In an intensely inter-related culture, activities "begin to
affect" others early in their existence. Not only is this "test" incapable
of intelligent application, but since 1919 the record attests the anti-
pathy of our people to phrases that would so readily permit suppres-
sions of freedom. It is somewhat perplexing that a Justice can subscribe
to the clear and present danger concept and yet condone limitations of
the First Amendment freedoms "whenever activities begin to affect"
others. Certainly this is not the Justice Jackson of the Barnette5' and
47. The "abuse" test derives primarily from the language of the state constitutions all
of which, excepting Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Vermont and West
Virginia, in protecting freedom provide for responsibility for its abuse. Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 n. 5 (1946). Note the example, too, of the United States Su-
preme Court in related freedom controversies: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708
(1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); and Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). For early origins of the abuse test, see 2 Kl,"r's Coia=, Lecture
24.
48. Davis v. State, 118 Ohio St. 25, 31, 160 N. E. 473, 475 (1928); People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 211, 68 N.E. 243, 246 (1903); People v. Dale, 47 N.Y.S.2d 702, 707
(City Ct. 1944).
49. People v. Cole, 219 N. Y. 98, 111, 113 N. E. 790, 794 (1916); State v. Marble, 72
Ohio St. 21, 31, 73 N. E. 1063, 1066 (1905) ; Boiling v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 133
Pac. 2d 803 (1943); State v. Neitrzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 Pac. 939 (1912). This unwise
approach has its origin in Blackstone who said "if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity." 4 Br. Co..* 152.
It was unfortunately encouraged by language of Cooley. COOLEY, Co srru xo:;A Lna-
TATioxS 422 (1st ed. 1868).
50. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944).
51. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Ballard52 cases. Fortunately, there is little likelihood that the "begin to
affect" criterion will ever secure judicial or popular acceptance.
Usually claims of religious liberty are denied with some general state-
ment to the effect that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom
"does not deprive the state of its police power to enact laws for the pro-
tection of the public safety and morals and the protection of the general
welfare."53 Even if the statements were correct they would afford no
standard and, at best, they are an inadequate statement of principle.
Since the record of the United States Supreme Court in its applica-
tion of the clear and present danger test to religious liberty controversies
is erratic, and because the decisions of lower federal and state courts
are typically without reference to test or principle, 4 inquiry into the
judicially determined limits of freedom of religion must turn to an
investigation of case authority. An appreciation of case authority will be
facilitated by an awareness that the societal and individual interest in
freedom of religion clashes on occasion with social interests in health,
safety, order and morality.
THE SOCIETAL INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND ITS LIMITATION
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
The claim of religious liberty has been no defense to one who, in viola-
tion of statute, failed to provide medical attention for a child.f5 And
in Prince v. Massachusetts"6 the Supreme Court considered the health
and welfare of a child paramount to the asserted freedom of religion of
the child and her guardian in distributing religious literature on the
streets. The Supreme Court stated: "The right to practice religion freely
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to com-
municable disease or the latter to ill health or death."5 One may agree
with this statement of principle and still insist that any possibility of
harm to the child in the Prince case was, on the facts, very remote. Ap-
plication of the clear and present danger test should have resulted in a
52. United States v. Balard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
53. Davis v. State, 118 Ohio St. 25, 31, 160 N.E. 473, 475 (1928). See McMasters v.
State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922); St. Louis v. Hellscher, 295 Mo. 293, 242
S.W. 652 (1922).
54. The very rare lower federal and state court cases applying the clear and present
danger test to freedom of religion situations are these: Baxley v. United States, 134 F. 2d
937 (4th Cir. 1943); United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943);
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P. 2d 704 (1945); and Morgan v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A.2d 898 (1944).
55. State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y.
201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Owens v. State, 60 Okla. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
56. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
57. Id. at 166.
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reversal of the conviction. The Prince decision has been aptly described
as "a curious authoritarian island" in the generally liberal record of the
present Court. 8
Compulsory vaccination statutes have been upheld against claims that
they violated freedom of religion and the liberty of the individual. 0
And, just as religious liberty has afforded no immunity to one who violated
a compulsory education law,60 so it is no defense for failure to abide by
a statute requiring school attendance even of children whose parents
entertained religious beliefs against vaccination." Similarly, it has been
held that excluding unvaccinated children from the public schools is not
an unconstitutional abridgment of either the child's or the parent's re-
ligious freedom. 2 Nor does a requirement that public school pupils sub-
mit to a physical examination violate religious liberty.
In holding that freedom of religion does not exempt one from statutory
requirement of a health certificate before marriage, the court remarked
that it knew "of no church which desires its ministers to profane the
marriage tie by uniting a man afflicted with a loathsome disease to an
innocent woman."614
To the crime of practicing medicine without license, the claim of re-
ligious liberty has regularly failed as a defense.65 One court simply con-
cluded: "The regulation of the practice of medicine is a police regulation
for the protection of the public; it does not interfere with the exercise of
religious liberty. . . .' Another is more emphatic: "If such teacher or
minister administer a medicine or prescribe a medicine or assume the
58. Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. or PA. L. Pm-.
608, 637 (1949). The case has also been criticized in Summers, The Sources and Limits of
Religious Freedom, 41 Ir,. L. Rrv. 53, 78 (1946), and in 32 GEo. L. J. 309 (1944).
59. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; Cram v. School Bd. of Manchester,
82 N.H. 495, 136 At. 263 (1927).
60. Mosier v. Barren County Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948);
State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 At. 629 (1937); Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ., 58 A.2d 218
(N.J . 1948) ; Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S. E. 2d 342 (1948).
61. In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y. S. 2d 143 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944).
62. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E.
677 (1934); In re Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y. 235, 72 N. E. 97 (1904); City of New
Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tem. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918). See Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 32 (1905).
63. Streich v. Board of Educ., 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779 (1914).
64. Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 656, 147 N.W. 966, 971 (1914).
65. Fealy v. City of Birmingham, 15 Ala. App. 367, 73 So. 296 (1916); Smith v.
People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911); State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728
(1894) ; People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98, 113 N.E. 790 (1916); State v. Miller, 59 N. D. 286,
229 N. W. 569 (1930); State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N XE. 1063 (190); State v.
Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P. 2d 1033 (1932).
66. Fealy v. City of Birmingham, 15 Ala. App. 367, 372, 73 So. 296, 299 (1916).
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title of physician, then it is immaterial whether he claim or even prove
that it is a tenet of some religious organization. 0 7  Constitutional
protection is at times denied here because "the exercise of the art of heal-
ing for compensation . . . cannot be classed as an act of worship."08
Finally, freedom of religion immunizes no one from punishment for
violating a statute making criminal the use of poisonous snakes as part
of a religious service."
Generally, claims to religious liberty are not saved from punishment
under reasonable regulations reasonably calculated to protect the public
health.70 The decisions so determinative have not been characterized by
statement of controlling test or principle, but even the clear and present
danger test would usually be satisfied, as by the uncontrolled use of
poisonous snakes in a public assembly,71 and it is doubtful if any verb-
alization of rule or standard will produce results greatly divergent from
the foregoing statement of the law when society's interest in the public
health is opposed to its interest in religious expression.
THE SOCIETAL INTEREST IN THE SAFETY OF THE STATE AND ITS LIMITA-
TION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
In 1918 the United States Supreme Court passed "without anything
but statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an
interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amend-
ment resulted from the exemption clauses of the [selective service] act
... because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to
do more."72 This somewhat meager appraisal of societal interests has
been the authority for a host of lower federal court cases holding that
religious liberty is no defense for violating selective service acts.18 By
67. State v. Miller, 59 N.D. 286, 293, 229 N.W. 569, 572 (1930).
68. State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 169, 58 N.W. 728, 732 (1894).
69. Larson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W. 2d 972 (1942); State v. Massey,
229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E. 2d 179 (1949); Harden v. State, 216 S.W. 2d 708 (Tenn. 1948);
Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E. 2d 409 (1947).
70. "Counsel has emphasized the religious aspect presented by these cases. . . . The
argument from religious motivation has been foreclosed, so far as legislative power Is
concerned, since Reynolds v. United States.. .. " Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14,
21 n. 1 (1946) (concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge).
71. ". .. this danger is grave and immediate when and wherever the practice Is being
indulged." Harden v. State, 216 S.W. 2d 708, 711 (Tenn. 1948).
72. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).
73. Van Bibber v. United States, 151 F. 2d 444 (8th Cir. 1945); Roodenko v. United
States, 147 F. 2d 752 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 860 (1945); Hopper v.
United States, 142 F. 2d 181 (9th Cir. 1943); Checinski v. United States, 129 F. 2d 461
(6th Cir. 1942); Rase v. United States, 129 F. 2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); United States v.
Brooks, 54 F. Supp. 995 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); United States ex rel. Zucker v. Osborne, 54 F.
Supp. 984 (W. D. N.Y. 1944).
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1942 a court could say with little possibility of reversal that "The Con-
stitution grants no immunity from military service because of religious
convictions or activities."'74 The following year Judge Dobie held it "well
settled that though one is not punished in these United States for his
religious views and beliefs, yet one may be punished when through ex-
ternal conduct these views are put into practice, if such practice is
fraught with clear and present danger to the safety, morals, health or
general welfare of the community, and is violative of laws enacted for
their protection", and thereupon sustained a conviction for violation
of the draft law. 5 Judge Dobie's decision is a valuable illustration that
the clear and present danger test can be applied in religious liberty con-
troversies with ample protection to the state.
Claims of religious liberty were in 1934 subordinated by the Supreme
Court to the societal interest in the safety of the state. In Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California,6 the Court ruled that one op-
posed to military training because of his religious beliefs could not refuse
such training and still avail himself of the benefits of an education at a
public university. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court, stated: "Gov-
ernment, federal and state, each in its own sphere owes a duty to the
people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to
maintain peace and order and to assure the just enforcement of law. And
every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to sup-
port and defend government against all enemies.""u Then, in 1945, in
an equally unfortunate decision, the Supreme Court held, in effect, that
the safety of the state was so jeopardized by admission to the bar of one
whose religious beliefs did not permit bearing arms that conscientious
objectors cannot imperil the state by the practice of law. 8 The case is,
fortunately, of dubious validity today inasmuch as the cases principally
relied upon by the Court in defense of its decision 0 have been over-
ruled.80
As early as 1941 a lower federal court had held that freedom of re-
ligion was violated by requiring a flag salute as a condition of a permit
for the distribution of religious literature.8' Then, in 1943, West Virginia
74. Rase v. United States, 129 F. 2d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 1942).
75. Baxley v. United States, 134 F. 2d 937, 938 (4th Cir. 1943).
76. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
77. Id. at 262.
78. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
79. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimner,
279 U. S. 644 (1929).
80. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
81. Kennedy v. City of Moscow, 39 F. Supp. 26 (D. Idaho 1941).
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State Board of Education v. Barnette82 overruled the ill-starred Gobitis
decision83 and held that a flag salute could not be compelled of a public
school pupil whose religious principles were opposed thereto. Obviously
there was no clear and present danger to the safety of the nation from
the reluctance of a school child to engage in the mockery of a symbolism
antipathetic to its deepest beliefs. In a companion case the Court prop-
erly found no clear and present danger sufficient to support conviction of
a teacher who advised the desirability of refraining from flag salutes.84
The following year a New Jersey court held, in an interesting application
of the clear and present danger test, that freedom of religion was violated
by denying a civil service position to the best qualified applicant simply
because he did not believe in taking the flag salute.85
Application of the clear and present danger test-or any other-will
probably not prevent convictions for refusing to fight when the nation
is struggling for survival. But proper utilization of the test can not con-
ceivably justify the Hamilton and Summers"0 decisions, for under no test
is society's interest in the safety of its political institutions even remotely
endangered by the beliefs of the individuals concerned.87
THE SOCIETAL INTEREST IN PEACE AND GOOD ORDER AND ITS LIMITATION
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
As early as 1890 the United States Supreme Court asserted that "It
was never intended or supposed that the [First] amendment could be in-
voked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts
inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society.""8 Fifty years
later, Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court in the Cantwell case, said,
in dicta, that "a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation
regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its
streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safe-
guard the peace, good order and comfort of the community, without
unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.""9 He further reflected: "No one would have the hardihood
to suggest that ... religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others
82. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
83. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
84. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
85. Morgan v. Civil Service Commission, 131 N.J. L. 410, 36 A. 2d 898 (1944).
86. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
87 "There was obviously no clear and present danger for the state's action was not
based on any of his conduct but purely upon his confessed beliefs." Summers, The Sources
and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 IL. L. REV. 53, 78 (1946).
88. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
89. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, ap-
pears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious." 0 The
Court took pains to point out, however, that it will take something more
than the generalized and indefinite concept of the common law breach
of peace to outweigh the societal interest in freedom of religion under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The state must, according to the Court, employ
"a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as con-
stituting a clear and present danger .... ,o
Within the year the same Court concluded that religious liberty was
not unconstitutionally abridged by a statute requiring members of a re-
ligious group to make application for a permit before publicly parading,
when such permit could be denied only because of public inconvenience
in the use of the streets. Chief Justice Hughes thought he saw an
analogy to the common traffic signal. "One would not be justified", he
said, "in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his
religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that
means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions."03
The claim of religious freedom was dismissed summarily. "The argu-
ment as to freedom of worship is also beside the point," the Chief Jus-
tice pontificated, "No interference with religious worship or the practice
of religion in any proper sense is shown. . . ."I As has been earlier
noted, the "in any proper sense" language is only an example of the
sophistry of definition, not at all new and not at all reputable.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,91 the Supreme Court sustained the
conviction of a minister who called a police officer an "offensive or de-
90. Id. at 308.
91. Id. at 311.
92. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), 21 B.U.L. Ray. 540, 9 Dunn B.A.J1.
151.
93. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
94. Id. at 578. Note also Bennett v. City of Dalton, 69 Ga. App. 438, 25 S. E. 2d 726,
aff'd per curian, 320 U. S. 712 (1943), holding freedom of religion not violated by conviction
of Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to move on when requested by an officer attempting
to break up a crowd after a disturbance, and New York v. Hussock, 23 N.Y.S.2d 520
(Spec. Sess. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 659 (1941), similarly affirming conviction of one
who refused to move on when ordered by police breaking up a crowd becaue of traffic
peril. See also the following state court cases wherein control of street demonstrations
was upheld in spite of claimed denials of religious liberty: Mashburn v. City of Bloom-
ington, 32 II1. App. 243 (1889); Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224
(1889) ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886); and State v. White, 6S N. H.
48, 5 Aft. 828 (1886).
95. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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risive name" interdicted by statute, Justice Murphy observing that he
could not "conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion
in any sense of the term."9 The decision marks an unfortunate abridge-
ment in, if not freedom of religion, freedom of speech. Supposedly the
societal interest in peace and good order is involved here. Even though
another addressee might breach the peace under such circumstances, can
it be assumed that a peace officer would breach the peace upon hearing
annoying or derisive words? It is unfortunate that the attention of the
Supreme Court was not called to the far better language of a New York
court in the identical situation. The New York judge said: "I do not
think that any remark, however insulting, addressed while under lawful
arrest, to the police officer making the arrest (there being no evidence
that the remark was made in a loud voice or public manner), can be
deemed disorderly conduct tending to, or intended to provoke, a breach
of the peace. The law does not contemplate that the officer would assault
a person in his custody by reason of a remark addressed to him, yet in
no other way could the remark tend to provoke a breach of the peace." 7
Surely there was not even a remote possibility of substantive evil, let
alone a clear and present danger, from the words of the arrested minis-
ter. Furthermore, as the recent Terminiello case"8 well illustrates, the
fact that the exercise of a First Amendment freedom results in some
disturbance does not justify its suppression or punishment... there must
be grave, substantial evil. Can one imagine that the foundations of so-
ciety were imperiled by the police officer being called a "racketeer"?
On the relationship between the liberty of a religious group and the
possibility of disorder Judge Sanborn has made a magnificent contribu-
tion in his opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Sellers v. Johnson.9 He there wrote: "The theory that a group of in-
dividuals may be deprived of their constitutional rights of assembly,
speech and worship if they have become so unpopular with, or offensive
to, the people of a community that their presence in a public park to
deliver a Bible lecture is likely to result in riot and bloodshed, is interest-
ing but somewhat difficult to accept. Under such a doctrine, unpopular
political, racial and religious groups might find themselves virtually
inarticulate. Certainly the fundamental rights to assemble, to speak,
96. Id. at 571.
97. People v. Lukowsky, 94 Misc. 500, 501, 159 N.Y. Supp. 599, 600 (Gen. Sess. 1916).
Compare State v. Moore, 166 N. C. 371, 81 S. E. 693 (1914) where conviction was reversed
though a "fighting" word was used to a police officer, with State v. Maggard, 80 Mo. App.
286 (1899) where a police officer was held not a "person" within the meaning of an
ordinance prohibiting the use thereto of words tending to disturb the peace.
98. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 934 (1949).
99. 163 F. 2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947).
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and to worship cannot be abridged merely because persons threaten to
stage a riot or because peace officers believe or are afraid that breaches
of the peace will occur if the rights are exercised.""' The Court granted
an injunction to the religious group restraining public officers from inter-
fering with the group's use of a public park in their religious worship.
It has been held that freedom of religion does not justify disturbing
the neighborhood by excessive noise.' 0 Nor is this freedom denied by
declaring an edifice used for noisy religious services a public nuisance. 0 2
Furthermore, religious freedom affords no justification for the un-
permitted invasion of a private home,'0 3 a housing project,'' or a hote100
in search of converts. Where, however, it is a public community or
even a company town there can be no complete restraint on evangelizing
activities or censorship thereof.'
In 1940 the United States Supreme Court emphasized that "Nothing
we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak
of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the pub-
lic." 07 By that time it was well-established in the state courts that
religious liberty did not protect fortune-telling in violation of the crim-
inal law.' 08 " . .. religious liberty does not include the right", states a
typical court, "to introduce and carry out every scheme or purpose which
persons see fit to claim as part of their religious system." 09 Since 1917
it should have been evident that claims of religious liberty would not
prevent punishment for using the mails to defraud, where the obtaining
100. Id. at 881.
101. City of Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S.W. 316 (Mo. 1927).
102. Morison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C. 25, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940).
103. State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 6 So. 2d 377 (1941); People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y.
154, 38 N.E. 2d 478 (1941); People v. Dale, 47 N.Y. S. 2d 702 (City CL 1944). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mas§. 632, 48 N.E. 2d 678 (1943).
104. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc., Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.
339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948), 48 COr.. L. REv. 1105.
105. People v. Vaughan, 64 Cal. App. 2d 282, 150 P. 2d 964 (1944).
106. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944); Martin v. City of Struther-, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika,
319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 303 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
107. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
108. In re Wedderburn, 66 Cal. App. 2d 70, 151 P. 2d 889 (1944); City of St. Louis
v. Hellscher, 295 Mo. 293, 242 S. W. 652 (1922); Dill v. Hamiton, 137 Neb. 722, 291 N. W.
62 (1940); People v. Ashley, 184 App. Div. 520, 172 N.Y. Supp. 282 (2d Dep't 1918).
Davis v. State, 118 Ohio St. 25, 160 N.E. 473 (1928) ; M Masters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim.
318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922); State v. Neltzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 Pac. 939 (1912). But see
State v. DeLaney, 1 N. J. Misc. 619, 621, 122 AUt. 890, 891 (1923).
109. McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 323, 207 Pac. 566, 568 (1922).
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of money was with fraudulent intent." 0 Then, in 1944, the Supreme
Court held that where the defendants did not "honestly and in good faith
believe" their representations, freedom of religion was no bar to punish-
ment under the mail fraud statute."' Justice Stone remarked: "I am
not prepared to say that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of re-
ligion affords immunity from criminal prosecution for the fraudulent
procurement of money by false statements as to one's religious ex-
periences, more than it renders polygamy or libel immune from criminal
prosecution. [Cases omitted.] I cannot say that freedom of thought and
worship includes freedom to procure money by making knowingly false
statements about one's religious experiences.""' 2 Although this state-
ment was made in a dissenting opinion (joined in by Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter), it is suggested that the members of the majority would
not dispute it. In an unaccompanied dissent Justice Jackson avers that
any investigation into the disbelief of religious representation violates
the constitutional freedom of religion, and he "would have done with
this business of judicially examining other people's faiths." '
Society's interest in safeguarding the purse of the citizenry justifies
some regulation of solicitors, including those for religious causes and
periodicals. The extent of permissible registration statements, badges,
bonds and reports has not yet been clearly defined by the courts." 4
Since 1923 it has been clear that freedom of religion permits the teach-
ing of a foreign language in a parochial school.", And, since 1925, it has
been established that there is no interest in the state that can require a
parent to send his child to a public school."( It has also been held that
110. New v. United States, 245 Fed. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665
(1918).
111. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
112. Id. at 88 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stone).
113. Id. at 95 (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson). Following the principle of the
Ballard case is United States v. Carruthers, 152 F. 2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 787 (1946).
114. Compare City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F. 2d 661 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 562 (1941), upholding an identification badge requirement of distributors of
religious literature; and dictum in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) that
"Without doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose,
to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent." Id. at 306, with the language of the Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
538 (1945), especially: "As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order
to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights
of free speech and free assembly." Id. at 539. And see the language of the Court in the
inconclusive cases Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543 (1947) and Rescue Army v.
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), especially the latter at 575.
115. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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if a child attends a public school it cannot be forced to participate in
dancing against the religious beliefs of the parents."7
Tim SOCIETAL INTEREST IN MORALITY AND ITS LnITATION OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Somewhat incongruously, the societal interest in religious liberty
clashes intermittently with the interest in morality. "... it has long
been held that the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed
affords no defense in a prosecution for bigamy." n Nor will the fact that
the defendant's multiple wives are proper according to his religious belief
prevent punishment for violation of the Mann Act.n0 Claims of religious
freedom did not prevent enforcement of prohibition laws supposedly
expressive of society's interest in morality.2 - Religious liberty, it has
been held, is no excuse for a minister's use of obscene language in a
sermon.' 21 And, similarly, a punishment for blasphemy has been sus-
tained over claims that the speaker's religious liberty was denied' -
CONCLUSION
The societal and individual interest in religious liberty will on occasion
clash with other social interests. In the weighing of these interests, the
judiciary will be tempted merely to mirror the attitudes and passions of
the temporary majority unless they are ever cognizant that the deliberate
constitutional enshrinement of freedom of religion requires that attempted
legislative denials thereof be condemned unless they can be proven im-
peratively necessary for the protection of a fundamental societal interest.
Apparent to all must be the very important interest, not only individual
but societal,"a in dignifying the individual through the full development
of his spiritual powers. The perceptive jurist is also well aware of the
social utility resulting from sanctions the law can never provide.
Perhaps no test, no verbalized phrase, can keep the judiciary to its
constitutional responsibility. 4 But to the extent that words can hold
117. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac. 49 (1921).
118. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946). Church of Latter Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878) ; Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 95 Pac. 26 (1903) ;
State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), af'd per curiam, 324 U.S. 829 (1945).
119. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
120. Ruppert Corp. v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920); Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F. 2d 971
(W.D. Wash. 1929), aff'd mem., 36 F.2d 1021; State v. Kramer, 49 S.D. 56, 206 N.W.
468 (1925).
121. Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915).
122. State v. Mockus, 120 Ae. 84, 113 AUt. 39 (1921).
123. See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. Rxv. 445, 453 (1915).
124. "The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the assaults of
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judges and juries to their duty, the clear and present danger test will-
better than any of its competitors-encourage those charged with the de-
limitation of religious liberty to pause and reflect 12 5 upon the primacy of
the enshrined socio-legal values in religious liberty, and to investigate
fully the purported need for its denial.
Today no presumption of constitutionality abets legislation abridging
freedom of religion. 20 In fact, there is some recognition that a presump-
tion of unconstitutionality burdens all legislative denials of the First
Amendment freedoms. 27 This is a concept of legal significance, deriva-
tive from the specific embodiment of the fundamental freedoms in the
First Amendment, that should affectuate the constitutional purpose and
more adequately safeguard religious liberty and the companion freedoms
than pious, but legally insignificant, incantations. 2 It is rather doubtful
that the presumption of unconstitutionality is presently recognized by a
majority of the Court,' although some competent observers have so
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the
scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles, by enshrining
them in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a body of defenders."
CARDozo, THE NATURE O = m JuniCIAL PROCESS 92 (1921). "Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (con-
curring opinion of Justice Brandeis). See also BECKER, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBmITY IN
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LiRE 26 (1945); CusHmAx, SAPErUARDINO CIvI LiDERTY TODAY
84 (1945) ; HINEs, THE REvIvAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 82 (1930) ; ADAMS, A DEFENsE
OF THE CONsTITUnoAL GOVERMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IV (1787); PATERSON, FREE
SPEECH3: AND A FREE PRESS 3 (1939); and Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guar-
antees of Liberty, 20 NoTRE DAM LAW. 347, 395 (1945).
125. Biddle feels this is the real value of the clear and present danger test. BIDDLE, MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES 156 (1946).
126. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938); Hernodon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242,
258 (1937). "This presumption in favor of state legislation .. .does not extend .. . to
legislation which is challenged as restricting civil liberties." Barnett, Mr. Justice Black, And
the Supreme Court, 8 U. or Cm. L. REv. 20, 27 (1940).
127. "The presumption rather is against the legislative intrusion into these domains."
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (concur-
ring opinion of Justice Rutledge joined in by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy). "... the
human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to sweep away those
freedoms is prima fade invalid." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 173 (1944) (dis-
senting opinion of Justice Murphy). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 165 (1945)
(concurring opinion of Justice Murphy).
128. The courts refer to freedom of religion as having a "preferred place" and "pre-
ferred position."
129. Note Justice Frankfurter's insistence that "the claim that any legislation is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional which touches the field of the First Amendment and the
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concluded. 130 It is to be hoped that the Court will soon give recognition
and application to such a presumption.
Worth remembering are the words of a recently departed member of the
United States Supreme Court: "Freedom of religion has a higher dig-
nity under the Constitution than municipal or personal convenience. In
these days, free men have no loftier responsibility than the preservation
of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will not suffer but will
prosper in its observance."'
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Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as the latter's concept of 'liberty' contains what is specifi-
cally protected by the First, has never commended itself to a majority of this Court."
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 94 (1949) (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
Green feels the presumption of unconstitutionality "cannot yet be taken as established."
Green, Tze Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. or PA. L. REv. 60%,
635 (1949).
130. Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YAxEn
L. J. 1319 (1941); Cushman, Keep Our Press Free, PuI~rc AIrAms Pwuszr No. 123, 23
(1946); 40 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1940); 49 CoL. L. REv. 363, 369 (1949).
131. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 151 (1943) (concurring opinion of
Justice Murphy).
